Soviets and their Irish lackys against Irish Freedom 1974
Free State Papers – 1977: FitzGerald’s ‘red revolution’ in foreign affairs 30 December 2007 By T Ryle Dwyer As minister for foreign affairs in 1973, Garret FitzGerald initiated a virtual diplomatic revolution within the department by initiating steps to dramatically expand "Ireland’s" diplomatic representation abroad. He achieved this despite tight budgetary restrictions. Much of the details are revealed in the recently-released state papers. For instance, the Irish ambassador to Sweden would double as the ambassador to Poland, and the Irish ambassador in Austria would also be accredited to Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The ambassadors from all those countries who served in London also served as ambassadors to Ireland. Libya was not one of the 30 countries mentioned in 1973, but the Department of Foreign Affairs considered it prudent to help bring its leader, Muammar Gaddafi, in from the cold by exchanging representatives. The department realised the Libyan regime was ‘‘characterised by an extreme anglophobia’’, which led it to be sympathetic, not only to the IRA, but also to the UDA. Gaddafi was behind the IRA arms shipment seized aboard the Claudia off the south coast in 1972. Once Irish diplomats engaged in talks with Libya, however, Gaddafi announced that he had cut off supplies to the IRA. Ireland established full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on a residency basis in 1974. Following the appointment of the first Irish ambassador to the USSR, the Soviets also adopted a more helpful attitude to the IRA’s campaign in the North. Komsomolskaya Pravda denounced the ‘‘bloody terror’’ of the Provisional IRA, which ‘‘will not promote the solution of the political problems’’ in the North. It categorised the bombing outrages in Britain as ‘‘blind terror’’ and ‘‘sheer senselessness’’. It was particularly forceful in denouncing the Birmingham pub bombings, because it said the victims were innocent men and women, who did not have any connection with the ‘‘British colonial policy of suppressing the democratic freedoms of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland’’. The newspaper added that the bombing would not ‘‘advance a solution of any of the problems of Ulster by one iota’’. Michael O’Riordan, general secretary of the Communist Party of Ireland; his deputy, James Stewart; and Betty Sinclair of the party’s national executive published a number of articles in Soviet newspapers. They were all critical of the Provisional IRA’s campaign of violence. O’Riordan and Sinclair noted that Marx and Engels had also been critical of the Fenian movement, even though they admired the personal courage of Fenians. O’Riordan reported that the Dublin government was implicated in the rise of the Provisionals by offering them £100,000 to defend the Catholics of Belfast. While the Official IRA rejected this ‘‘unprincipled’’ offer, future leaders of the Provisional IRA accepted the money, and this gave rise to the breakaway movement in 1970. Some people were unhappy with this new relationship with communists. Fr Thomas F Molloy, the parish priest of Kilmeena, near Westport, Co Mayo, wrote a particularly caustic letter to Garret FitzGerald on Easter Sunday in 1976. ‘‘You will be remembered in history as the minister who opened the gates to admit the Trojan horse; the minister who, in defiance of public opinion and, indeed, common sense, first brought in the Russians to Ireland, not a reasonable handful, but by the score, so that our overstretched security forces could not possibly keep these most dangerous of subversives under surveillance.” The irate priest concluded: ‘‘God save Ireland! Especially from the Godless!” During FitzGerald’s term as foreign minister, Ireland also established diplomatic relations with China, after the Chinese made an approach to the Irish ambassador in Canberra, Australia. In arguing for formal relations, the Department of Foreign Affairs contended that China was a booming market, so Ireland should seize the opportunity to get a foot in the door as early as possible. China appreciated Irish support for its recognition at the United Nations, and Dublin recognised the Chinese regime in February 1972. The Chinese indicated their appreciation by taking the initiative in seeking to establish formal relations. However, there was opposition in the cabinet to the proposal. Paddy Donegan, then minister for defence, objected on security grounds, while John Boland, minister for the public service, objected because there was a government embargo on new services. But FitzGerald argued that establishing relations with China by appointing either the ambassador in Canberra or Tokyo would only cost about £3,000 a year, and this could be met by juggling expenditure within the existing budget. In 1975, Ireland only exported £60,000 worth of goods to China, while the latter’s trade with Ireland was worth £1.2 million. FitzGerald stated that he would like to establish a permanent diplomatic residence in Beijing as soon as ‘‘economic circumstances permit’’. In the past, China had been rather hostile towards Europe, but this had changed as a result of tensions with the Soviet Union, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs noted that the Chinese had been taking ‘‘an active interest in promoting the European Union, in the hope of creating a counter balancing on the Soviet Union’s western frontier’’. FitzGerald argued that it was ‘‘important to have a broader base for political and trade interests in Asia’’, so non-resident ambassadors were also appointed to Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. In addition, Ireland decided to exchange ambassadors on a non-resident basis with Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil. The cost of setting up such diplomatic relations would be limited to travel and subsistence expenses involved in one or two visits per year, the Department of Foreign Affairs argued. But dual or multiple accreditation would enhance opportunities for Irish diplomats to promote ‘‘the interests of Irish traders’’, as well as ‘‘enlisting the support of foreign governments for the political and economic policies of the government in the international sphere’’.
Free State Papers – 1977: FitzGerald’s ‘red revolution’ in foreign affairs 30 December 2007 By T Ryle Dwyer As minister for foreign affairs in 1973, Garret FitzGerald initiated a virtual diplomatic revolution within the department by initiating steps to dramatically expand "Ireland’s" diplomatic representation abroad. He achieved this despite tight budgetary restrictions. Much of the details are revealed in the recently-released state papers. For instance, the Irish ambassador to Sweden would double as the ambassador to Poland, and the Irish ambassador in Austria would also be accredited to Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The ambassadors from all those countries who served in London also served as ambassadors to Ireland. Libya was not one of the 30 countries mentioned in 1973, but the Department of Foreign Affairs considered it prudent to help bring its leader, Muammar Gaddafi, in from the cold by exchanging representatives. The department realised the Libyan regime was ‘‘characterised by an extreme anglophobia’’, which led it to be sympathetic, not only to the IRA, but also to the UDA. Gaddafi was behind the IRA arms shipment seized aboard the Claudia off the south coast in 1972. Once Irish diplomats engaged in talks with Libya, however, Gaddafi announced that he had cut off supplies to the IRA. Ireland established full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on a residency basis in 1974. Following the appointment of the first Irish ambassador to the USSR, the Soviets also adopted a more helpful attitude to the IRA’s campaign in the North. Komsomolskaya Pravda denounced the ‘‘bloody terror’’ of the Provisional IRA, which ‘‘will not promote the solution of the political problems’’ in the North. It categorised the bombing outrages in Britain as ‘‘blind terror’’ and ‘‘sheer senselessness’’. It was particularly forceful in denouncing the Birmingham pub bombings, because it said the victims were innocent men and women, who did not have any connection with the ‘‘British colonial policy of suppressing the democratic freedoms of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland’’. The newspaper added that the bombing would not ‘‘advance a solution of any of the problems of Ulster by one iota’’. Michael O’Riordan, general secretary of the Communist Party of Ireland; his deputy, James Stewart; and Betty Sinclair of the party’s national executive published a number of articles in Soviet newspapers. They were all critical of the Provisional IRA’s campaign of violence. O’Riordan and Sinclair noted that Marx and Engels had also been critical of the Fenian movement, even though they admired the personal courage of Fenians. O’Riordan reported that the Dublin government was implicated in the rise of the Provisionals by offering them £100,000 to defend the Catholics of Belfast. While the Official IRA rejected this ‘‘unprincipled’’ offer, future leaders of the Provisional IRA accepted the money, and this gave rise to the breakaway movement in 1970. Some people were unhappy with this new relationship with communists. Fr Thomas F Molloy, the parish priest of Kilmeena, near Westport, Co Mayo, wrote a particularly caustic letter to Garret FitzGerald on Easter Sunday in 1976. ‘‘You will be remembered in history as the minister who opened the gates to admit the Trojan horse; the minister who, in defiance of public opinion and, indeed, common sense, first brought in the Russians to Ireland, not a reasonable handful, but by the score, so that our overstretched security forces could not possibly keep these most dangerous of subversives under surveillance.” The irate priest concluded: ‘‘God save Ireland! Especially from the Godless!” During FitzGerald’s term as foreign minister, Ireland also established diplomatic relations with China, after the Chinese made an approach to the Irish ambassador in Canberra, Australia. In arguing for formal relations, the Department of Foreign Affairs contended that China was a booming market, so Ireland should seize the opportunity to get a foot in the door as early as possible. China appreciated Irish support for its recognition at the United Nations, and Dublin recognised the Chinese regime in February 1972. The Chinese indicated their appreciation by taking the initiative in seeking to establish formal relations. However, there was opposition in the cabinet to the proposal. Paddy Donegan, then minister for defence, objected on security grounds, while John Boland, minister for the public service, objected because there was a government embargo on new services. But FitzGerald argued that establishing relations with China by appointing either the ambassador in Canberra or Tokyo would only cost about £3,000 a year, and this could be met by juggling expenditure within the existing budget. In 1975, Ireland only exported £60,000 worth of goods to China, while the latter’s trade with Ireland was worth £1.2 million. FitzGerald stated that he would like to establish a permanent diplomatic residence in Beijing as soon as ‘‘economic circumstances permit’’. In the past, China had been rather hostile towards Europe, but this had changed as a result of tensions with the Soviet Union, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs noted that the Chinese had been taking ‘‘an active interest in promoting the European Union, in the hope of creating a counter balancing on the Soviet Union’s western frontier’’. FitzGerald argued that it was ‘‘important to have a broader base for political and trade interests in Asia’’, so non-resident ambassadors were also appointed to Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. In addition, Ireland decided to exchange ambassadors on a non-resident basis with Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil. The cost of setting up such diplomatic relations would be limited to travel and subsistence expenses involved in one or two visits per year, the Department of Foreign Affairs argued. But dual or multiple accreditation would enhance opportunities for Irish diplomats to promote ‘‘the interests of Irish traders’’, as well as ‘‘enlisting the support of foreign governments for the political and economic policies of the government in the international sphere’’.